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ABSTRACT: Recent scholarship has adduced convincing evidence that, underlying the late 
medieval and early modern discourse on witchcraft and diabolism, there lay not only popular 
folkloric and religious beliefs, but also real practical activities by which individuals made 
manifest their malicious intent toward others, as well as subjective experiences of interaction 
with supernatural entities, some of which were interpreted as the Christian Devil. This 
hypothesis raises a number of hermeneutic questions concerning how the social and material 
conditions predicating concrete acts of maleficium related to practitioners' social psychology and 
moral self-construction. Through the interpretive frame of Friedrich Nietzsche's antithesis of 
'master' and 'slave' moralities, this paper argues that the Christian theological and cultural 
context of early modern Europe primed individuals to experience the constraints and stresses of 
everyday life in vividly moralized terms, and to strategically negotiate their own personal 
advantage by realigning themselves within this moral order. 
KEYWORDS: Early Modern Europe; Nietzsche; Social Psychology; Witchcraft 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship has adduced convincing evidence that, underlying the late-
medieval and early-modern discourse on witchcraft and diabolism, there lay not only 
popular folkloric and religious beliefs, but also real practical activities by which 
individuals made manifest their malicious intent toward others, and subjective 
phenomena including experiences of interaction with supernatural entities – some of 
which were interpreted, either ad hoc or retrospectively, as the Christian Devil. Both 
Edward Bever and Emma Wilby, for example, have advanced comprehensive 
arguments that the material austerities and interpersonal tensions characterizing life in 
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the small, close-knit communities of early modern Europe frequently motivated casual 
and semi-professional magical practitioners to engage in both ritualized and reflexive 
activities which, mediated by psychological and neuro-physical processes, generated 
viscerally real experiences and physiological effects in both the practitioners and those 
upon whom they practiced.1 While the prosecutorial concept of a global diabolic 
conspiracy appears to have been little more than a paranoid delusion cobbled together 
from learned elites' theological assumptions and misinterpretations of folk-practices, the 
specific acts of illicit magic for which individuals were interrogated and punished 
sometimes had a basis in physical reality, and claims of harm caused through occult 
means were not necessarily transparent slander or pure fantasy. The incriminating 
testimonies of women and men prosecuted for witchcraft in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century continental Europe and the British Isles sometimes reflected not merely 
demonological presuppositions projected upon them by their inquisitors, nor simply the 
idiosyncratic products of individual psychoses, but rather expressed the defendants' real 
experiences of their own supernatural agency. 
This descriptive hypothesis suggests a number of interrelated hermeneutic 
questions: What were the subjective social and psychological meanings of these 'realities 
of witchcraft'? How did self-confessed practitioners of antinomian sorcery, some of 
whom believed themselves to have entered into a pact with the Devil, justify crossing 
what was, in a society fundamentally structured by Christian concepts and values, a 
moral event horizon? What was the significance to them of doing so? And how did the 
social and material conditions that hypothetically predicated concrete acts of maleficium 
relate to these individuals' moral self-construction? While scholars such as Per Faxneld, 
Jesper Petersen, and others have investigated the cultures and ideologies of more 
modern forms of secular, religious, and esoteric satanism,2 the social psychology and 
self-consciousness of individuals representing what may be the earliest constellation of 
satanist beliefs and practices for which the historical record provides evidence remain 
largely opaque. I propose to address these questions through the novel interpretive 
frame of Friedrich Nietzsche's antithesis of master and slave moralities, as found in his 
On the Genealogy of  Morals and other pertinent writings – not as Nietzsche's historical 
account of an evolutionary process, but rather as an ahistorical psychoanalytic device, 
and a prompt to engaging historical actors through the sociological imagination. 
Through this lens, and drawing upon evidentiary materials representing historical and 
                                                          
1 Edward Bever, The Realities of Witchcraft and Popular Magic in Early Modern Europe, New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008. Emma Wilby, Cunning Folk and Familiar Spirits, Portland, Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 
Emma Wilby, The Visions of Isobel Gowdie, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2010. 
2 P. Faxneld and J. A. Petersen (eds), The Devil's Party: Satanism in Modernity, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
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cross-cultural manifestations of transgressive magical activities, I will argue that the 
Christian theological and cultural context of early modern Europe, particularly as it 
was structured by the concept of original sin delineated in Calvinist theology, primed 
individuals to experience the constraints and stresses of everyday life in vividly 
moralized terms, and to strategically negotiate their own personal advantage by 
realigning themselves within this moral order. 
A NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS: THE THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
Abiding as a potential within Christianity since at least Augustine, but especially 
following the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the subsequent 
propagation of Calvinist theology, the doctrine of eschatological predestination 
combined with and reinforced the 'total depravity' interpretation of original sin, leaving 
human beings incorrigibly damned save for the grace of God, which in turn is only 
extended to a predetermined and immutable class of the elect.3 
Nietzsche's genealogical derivation of punishment as satisfaction of debt has 
significant implications for how the Christian concept of original sin can be 
understood. Nietzsche conjectures that “...punishment, as requital, evolved quite 
independently of any presupposition concerning freedom or non-freedom of the will...” 
and “[t]hroughout the greater part of human history punishment was not imposed 
because one held the wrongdoer responsible for his deed, thus not on the presupposition 
that only the guilty one should be punished...”.4 Such a formulation of the permissible 
grounds for punishment (that is, for extraction of payment) would prima facie authorize 
imposing a hereditarily transmitted debt burden upon the human race for an as-yet 
undischarged (and undischargeable) ancestral sin. 
 Nietzsche (Genealogy 62-3) notes that “...the major moral concept Schuld [guilt] 
has its origin in the very material concept Schulden [debts]...”. The idea of original sin 
imposes an infinite debt which is not within the power of any individual to repay 
(Canons c. 1, §1; c. 3-4, §3). Thus indebted, one effectively forfeits the right to satisfaction 
of any subsequent debts, of necessarily lesser magnitude, incurred against oneself. If 
one nonetheless proceeds to extract restitution of a debt, for instance by taking revenge 
for some injury to oneself, one implicitly usurps the prerogative to satisfaction 
                                                          
3 Canons of Dort, trans. Faith Alive Christian Resources, Christian Reformed Church in North America, 2011, c. 1, §6-7, 
https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/confessions/canons-dort, accessed February 4, 2017. John 
Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. H. Beveridge, 2005, II.1-3, III.21, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.i.html. Accessed February 18, 2017. 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, W. Kaufmann (ed), On the Genealogy of Morals/Ecce Homo, trans. W. Kaufmann and 
R. J. Hollingdale, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 63. 
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belonging to one's ultimate creditor, namely God. Recognizing this, more or less 
consciously and explicitly, yet unwilling to renounce the intuited right to just restitution, 
one might conceivably elect to void the patron-client relationship underpinning the 
debt by placing oneself unambiguously under the patronage of the creditor's adversary. 
I suggest here that the Devil in whom one might thus seek recourse was the egoic 
projection and ethical refuge of individuals who, culturally unable to conceive of 
themselves as morally justified, nevertheless felt compelled to act upon the imperative 
to retributive restitution for perceived wrongs done to them. Having projected the 
injunction to self-denial onto God as the locus of moral order (Genealogy 92), 
Christianity, in order to reconcile the demands of the ego with the possibility of human 
virtue, then projected self-affirmation onto the Devil. 
The moral status of the early-modern European practices of maleficium may be 
thrown into relief by contrast with that of analogous (and often functionally identical) 
practices of witchcraft and counter-witchcraft in a cultural context not conditioned by 
the preconceptions of Christian anthropology. In ancient Babylonia, for instance, 
highly developed legal institutions provided the metaphors through which many other 
spheres of life were interpreted, including that of perceived assault by sorcery.5 In this 
secular, bureaucratic cosmos, there is no moral injunction against seeking personal 
satisfaction for an injury unjustly sustained, nor even against doing so by means of 
malefic magic; the legitimacy of the magical 'denunciations' through which parties 
might attack and counter-attack one another depends solely upon the legal merit of the 
grievances which motivate them (BWL 132-5). 
That the mere impulse to implicitly transgress a theoretical standard of Christian 
humility could constitute a basis for self-demonization becomes more plausible when 
considered in light of the utter ubiquity of influence accorded to the Devil in early 
modern Europe, to the extent that in Scotland “...in the mid-seventeenth century, 
educated Protestants considered the Devil to be responsible for anything that was not 
'godly'.... [including] thoughts, fantasies and bodily desires that did not conform to 
godly mores”(Visions 458-9). 
An awareness of this omnipresence – which can so easily grade into omnipotence – 
likely accounts for the fact that “...the idea that one could deliberately solicit the Devil's 
help to gain magical powers was in wide circulation by the turn of the seventeenth 
century”, and the always-marginal existence of the common masses meant there was a 
receptive intellectual market for an “...idea of the Devil...[which] lent a degree of 
cohesion to the disparate practices and beliefs of angry and alienated people in various 
                                                          
5 Tzvi Abusch, Babylonian Witchcraft Literature – Case Studies, Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1987, p. 127. 
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corners of Christendom”(Realities 181). Mikael Häll is surely correct in observing “[t]hat 
some of these outsiders would turn to the Devil as a kind of god of the outlawed and 
enemy of the established order is not surprising”.6 Witchcraft is a social malaise, and in 
early-modern Europe the Devil was a memetic vector transmitting the transgressive 
envy that was its pathogen. 
An awareness, more or less articulated depending upon both education and 
inclination to introspect, that the final disposition of one's eternal soul is inevitably and 
unknowably fixed could easily lead to the logical conclusion that, because one was 
already permanently either damned or saved, adherence to moral law was irrelevant 
(Visions 177). This realization in itself could presumably open up recourse to maleficium 
or more mundane antinomian activities simply as practical expedients for satisfying 
one's desires. Conversely, the extension of grace would seem to impose a debt of 
gratitude upon the elect that is of a magnitude equal to the debt of culpability incurred 
through the state of reprobation from which they are liberated. Moreover, the 
eschatological reward promised by salvation was rather distant from the immediate 
needs and desires of corporeal existence; even individuals confident in their own 
salvation could have been tempted by persistent grievances or a moment of intense 
distress to disclaim grace in favor of more tangible forms of relief. It was for individuals 
such as these that satanism avant la lettre, an explicit or tacit agreement with the Devil in 
exchange for material aid, may have appeared a pragmatic option. 
That a logic whereby one's debt to God could be rendered void underlay the 
concept of the diabolic pact as constructed by theologians and legal scholars, and to 
which no small number of confessed witches evidently subscribed, is implicit in the 
renunciation of baptism which was frequently the central element of such covenants. 
Whereas Wilby observes that the demonic familiars of accused witches made the 
renunciation of Christianity a basic condition of their service “...in the majority of trial-
derived encounter narratives”(Cunning Folk 96-7), specific reference to the abrogation of 
the baptismal sacrament appears in the records of sixteenth-century proceedings 
ranging from Avignon to Liège on the continent, and at Dirltown, Forfar, and 
Auldearn in mid-seventeenth century Scotland, with at least three such cases occurring 
there in 1662.7 Even in the sacramentally minimalist Reformed tradition, baptism was 
still the mechanism by which the elected faithful received spiritual regeneration and 
                                                          
6 Mikael Häll, '”It is Better to Believe in the Devil”: Conceptions of Satanists and Sympathies for the 
Devil in Early Modern Sweden', in P. Faxneld and J. A. Petersen (eds), The Devil's Party: Satanism in 
Modernity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 37. 
7 Henry Charles Lea, A. C. Howland (ed), Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft, vol. 3, 3 vols., 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939, p. 1221, 1289, 1335. Visions, p. 39, 87, 544. 
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salvation (Institutes IV.15). Repudiating this outward sign could be construed as a 
recantation of the faith upon which its efficacy depended. Recognition of any grace 
that might potentially have been extended to the renunciate, and thus of any reciprocal 
obligation to God, would thereby be withdrawn. Conversely, in a notable proportion of 
pact narratives and derivative literature, this rejection is immediately followed and 
mirrored by the subject's active receipt of a new baptism in faith with the Devil, often 
complete with a new baptismal name. Moreover, the advice of a seventeenth-century 
Franciscan handbook for confessors implies that witches might take it upon themselves 
to baptize children in the Devil's name, and as late as the eighteenth century, the 
assertion that witches' renunciation of Christian baptism was necessary to facilitate the 
Devil's influence could be found in a German priest's refutation of skeptics (Materials 
1375, 1465). These latter accounts and opinions assume a basically subordinate, 
dependent status of the witch relative to the Devil; cancellation of one's mortal debt 
only comes with one's recognition of the new master under whom it is annulled.  
A MARXIST ONTOLOGY: THE MATERIAL-SOCIAL BASE 
Nietzsche (Genealogy 125-8) contends that the idea of congenital guilt is a self-imposed 
safeguard against the nihilistic impulse of the moral 'slaves', those unable to positively 
affirm the painful facts of their mortal life and harboring ressentiment, a malicious envy, 
against those who can. Turned back upon themselves by bad conscience, society at 
large is spared the disintegrative effects of their spite. 
If, as Bever (Realities 77) suggests, “...early modern belief in the Devil as an 
immanent presence was... a way of getting people to recognize the nature and 
significance of their actions beyond the bounds of their local community”, then a 
willingness to accept the negative metaphysical consequences of one's actions could 
suggest the refusal to privilege such abstract moral imperatives over the much more 
present social and material imperatives of everyday life. Just as the Colombian shaman 
manipulates “...the deathly reifications and fear-inspiring mysteries worked into the 
popular imagination by the official discourse of suffering, order, and redemption...” in 
order to effect a ritual drama of healing that “...resists the seductive appeal of self-pity 
and redemption through suffering”,8 the diabolist mobilizes the Church's Devil to 
implicitly reject transcendental forms of redemption in favor of corporeal security and 
temporal empowerment. 
In exacting retribution against a party guilty of injuring oneself, one also manifests 
                                                          
8 Michael Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 
466-7. 
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the other face of Nietzsche's noble, self-possesed 'master': “In 'punishing' the debtor, 
the creditor participates in a right of  the masters:.... a warrant for and title to 
cruelty”(Genealogy 65), for as Nietzsche (Genealogy 40-2) makes abundantly clear 
elsewhere, the 'noble' psyche is constitutionally disposed toward acts of hubristic 
violence against its own 'others'. This aspect of the persona through which individuals 
might legitimize their pursuit of restitution may additionally have been conditioned by 
the precarious material circumstances of early modern village life. Wilby (Visions 158-9), 
for instance, draws attention to the burdens and abuses imposed upon peasants by the 
seventeenth-century Scottish manorial system, notwithstanding the scarcity, mortality, 
and general uncertainty faced by all classes to a greater or lesser degree in pre-
industrial societies, and in The Dawn Nietzsche posits cruelty as precisely “...the 
supreme enjoyment for men who live in the state of war of those small, continually 
endangered communities.... who are prepared for what is most terrible and hardened 
by deprivations and mores...”.9 
This juxtaposition of values, the hubris of the 'master' morality embedded within 
the ressentiment of the 'slave' morality, is also evinced in the norms of personal honor 
observed in early modern Scotland, where “...many people considered it quite 
appropriate for an individual to express resentments through revenge”, and “...believed 
that it was a slur on an individual's valour, family honour and pride to allow an offence 
to pass without retribution”(Visions 181). As Wilby (Visions 195) argues, the “...sense of 
satisfaction and resolution...” derived from the actual performance of maleficium against 
one's enemies, as much as the imputed effects thereof, is essentially one “...of having 
restored moral equilibrium...”. 
As Wilby (Cunning Folk 73) points out, resentment and the desire for revenge can be 
seen as defining characteristics of the witch qua witch, who “...alleviated her suffering 
by using the magical services of the familiar to harm those individuals she deemed 
responsible for her privation”. On one level, whereas some form of desire is inherent to 
every potentiality of social life, the retributive imperative is an expression of envy, the 
specific mode of desire fundamental to societies structured by inequality. The witch's 
rationale exactly mirrors that of the Babylonian egalkurra incantations which served the 
typical bureaucrat or courtier “...within the great paternalistic bureaucracy.... [whose] 
repressed anxieties and hatred against his colleagues are described [in the texts] as 
their jealously and hatred of him”, a process of psychological projection made manifest 
in a magical ritual.10 
                                                          
9 Nietzsche, Genealogy, p. 186. 
10 Mark J. Geller, 'Freud and Mesopotamian Magic', in T. Abusch and K. van der Toorn (eds.), 
Mesopotamian Magic – Textual, Historical, and Interpretative Perspectives, Groningen, Styx, 1999, p. 52. 
 BRIAN JOHNSON 283 
Even when it did not victimize others, magic which sought to secure material 
benefits could sometimes operate by undermining social controls to which the 
practitioner was subject. As Bever (Realities 162) relates, during the 1663 investigation of 
witchcraft accusations against Anna Schnabel, near Stuttgart in the Duchy of 
Württemberg, a neighbor claimed that Anna offered “...to teach her an incantation so 
that no forest ranger should see or catch her”. In addition to increasingly stringent 
regulations placed upon local communities' access to the Duchy's forests and their 
resources beginning in the late fifteenth century, “...under the morals regulations put 
into place at the end of the Thirty Years' War, simply being outside the bounds of the 
village and fields was suspect, so even if a villager was not poaching... being caught 
there by a ranger could still lead to trouble”. Sorcery, in this instance, was an attempt to 
circumvent the state's encroaching surveillance and discipline of the literal 'bodies 
politic' of the Württemberg peasants, and it was criminalized and prosecuted for that 
very reason. 
If the absence of explicit maleficium was no guarantee of security from prosecution 
for practitioners of magic, the complete lack of concrete evidence of any magical 
activity whatsoever was likewise no barrier against suspicion of maleficium. In 1705 a 
weaver, Conrad Hahn, of Altdorf was suspected of having “...joined 'the Devil's 
empire'...” after he allegedly “...produced an extraordinary amount of cloth in a single 
day...”, as judged by “...several masters...”(Realities 316). This indicates that economic 
output was somehow cause for suspicion, which suggests that production superiority 
was perceived as a threat by interested parties – perhaps, in this case, those “masters” 
against whom Hahn competed for market share. 
The discourse on witchcraft exists in an ebb and flow between its protagonists and 
antagonists, and becomes a common currency across intersecting segments of any 
society in which it arises. Just as the factors predicating the resort to witchcraft across 
cultural and chronological contexts are overwhelmingly socioeconomic, so too are its 
imagined manifestations. One Mesopotamian counter-witchcraft ritual, for instance, 
promises the patient reconciliation with his peers and an end to the social isolation 
which lies at the root of his physiological illness,11 and the diagnostic portion of another 
text observes that the victim's “...profit is cut off; people speak defamation about 
him...”.12  
In ancient Babylonian witchcraft discourse, the ascription of a patient's illness to 
                                                          
11 Marten Stol, 'Psychosomatic Suffering in Ancient Mesopotamia', in T. Abusch and K. van der Toorn 
(eds.), Mesopotamian Magic – Textual, Historical, and Interpretative Perspectives, Groningen, Styx, 1999, p. 63. 
12 Tzvi Abusch, 'Witchcraft and the Anger of the Personal God', in T. Abusch and K. van der Toorn 
(eds.), Mesopotamian Magic – Textual, Historical, and Interpretative Perspectives, Groningen, Styx, 1999, p. 88. 
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witchcraft was not necessarily incompatible with the ascription of that same illness to 
the anger of a god. Abusch cites a counter-witchcraft ritual which includes in its 
diagnosis the statement that “The wrath of his god and goddess is upon him” 
juxtaposed with assertions to the effect that “...witchcraft has been practiced against 
him...”.13 Elsewhere, Abusch ('Witchcraft' 104-5) attributes this logic to a late stage in the 
development of Mesopotamian religious thought, wherein “[e]ven when the victim is 
innocent... the witch is able to distance the personal god or to cause the god to be 
angry...”. This insertion of the witch into the web of rights, obligations, and 
transgressions determining the relationship between god and supplicant correlates with 
a period of increasing socioeconomic complexity in Mesopotamian state structures, in 
which “...the problems facing the society come increasingly from within the 
community itself...”('Witchcraft' 108). The  interpersonal rivalries and the potential for 
deceit and malfeasant litigation which exists only in highly integrated complex societies 
thus become reified in a consciousness of witchcraft – human ill-will given substance 
and force – as a potential etiology of any and all misfortune. 
SIN IN PERSON: A NEURO-COGNITIVE HYPOTHESIS 
As Bever (Realities 86-7) observes, normal human cognition comprises the simultaneous 
operation of multiple, relatively autonomous neuro-cognitive modules. Many such 
processes operate outside of conscious perception and control, and can sometimes 
behave with a coherent intentionality independent of the personal ego. Moreover, 
under certain conditions of neuro-cognitive priming, such autonomous patterns can 
become manifest to conscious perception as external, sentient entities, frequently in the 
form of auditory and visual phenomena within the sensorium. The manifest forms, 
behaviors, and subjective interpretations of these phenomena are mediated by 
immediate context as well as cultural presuppositions (Realities 92). Through interaction 
with these entities, individuals are often made privy to knowledge, typically in the form 
of non-discursive insights which “...generally involve an intuitive or descriptive 
understanding of and ability to act on people and things...”(Realities 205), which they 
had not been able to access or articulate during normal consciousness. 
While Bever's (Realities 92) insistence upon explaining experiences of this sort in 
terms of “...the breakdown of the 'self 's' control of the nervous system...” may be 
critiqued as excessively reductionist, his observation that such phenomena conveyed 
“...realizations that would not establish themselves in consciousness otherwise...” 
                                                          
13 Tzvi Abusch, 'The Internalization of Suffering and Illness in Mesopotamia', Studi epigrafici e linguistici sul 
Vicino Oriente Antico, vol. 15, 1998, p. 57. 
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nevertheless suggests a possible explanation for why many early modern Christians 
experienced them as manifestations of the Devil. As a phenomenon correlated with the 
emergence of information previously censored from consciousness, perhaps by other 
neuro-cognitive processes, the manifestation conveying that information may have 
been conditioned by the preconceptions of subjects to take the form of a culturally-
determined personification of transgression. 
Nietzsche (Genealogy 129) predicates his analysis of moralities upon the 
presupposition that “...man's 'sinfulness' is... merely the interpretation of... physiological 
depression...”, and this biological account of moral affect neatly bridges an interpretive 
gap to Bever's neurophysiology of manifest mental phenomena, because if 'sinfulness' 
corresponds to a physio-cognitive process, then it is just as susceptible to autonomous 
activation and personified manifestation as any other modular process of this sort. 
Thus, at least some of the encounters with a manifest entity interpreted as the Devil 
may have been instances of this kind of personification of unconscious cognition. 
Specifically, the form, character, and content of the manifestation in these instances 
would be motivated by culturally proscribed – and so repressed – feelings of 
resentment and entitlement to restitution within a social and material context of 
inequality, subordination, privation, and suffering. These sentiments, whether 
implicitly legitimized and articulated through a stereotyped 'pact' with an envisioned 
Devil, or in some other way made conscious and justified to oneself, could then license 
cathartic retributive action against those perceived as responsible for one's hardships, 
up to and including attacks against arbitrary representatives of one's community, such 
as the (evidently hallucinatory) murders and other crimes in which the seventeenth-
century cottar's wife Isobel Gowdie of Auldearn, Scotland professed to have 
participated (Visions 320-3). 
THE TRANSVALUATION OF VALUES 
In terms of what Marc Tyrrell calls an “anti-cosmology”,14 diabolism legitimates 
emergent psychological needs and desires that are incompatible with the moral content 
of a hegemonic cosmological and epistemological system (e.g. Christianity) by inverting 
the disenfranchised subject's value orientation within the very symbolic complex 
through which that system's moral content is expressed. Thus, “...the entire field of 
inquiry contained within the original cosmology is opened up for non-controlled 
                                                          
14 Marc W. D. Tyrrell, 'Warriors of the Left Hand Path: Radical Magic Applied to Criminal Ends', in R. 
J. Bunker (ed), Blood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious Activities, Bloomington, 
iUniverse, 2016. 
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examination to the limits of the generally accepted core components”('Warriors' 14). 
This revaluation opens up an imaginative space for diabolic witchcraft as a “...form of 
criminal magic... which inverts core components of its own worldview with the specific 
aim of gaining dominance and power via fear and terror through the use of techniques 
and technologies that are proscribed by the symbol system...”('Warriors' 6). It is 
precisely this logic of self-empowerment through the inversion of values which, in 
early-modern Christian societies, underpinned the Devil's status as “...the maximum 
power available for use in illicit spiritual activity”(Realities 183). 
That practitioners of maleficium could, in some instances, have internalized the kind 
of symbolic inversion outlined here is suggested by certain details found in the 
confessions produced by witchcraft suspects like Isobel Gowdie, which “...point... to the 
possibility that the accused believed herself to be a malevolent witch”(Visions 55). 
Indeed, militating against any simplistic hypothesis of false-memory production or 
other interrogatorial interference in the construction of her narrative is the fact that 
“...many of Isobel's demonological, specific maleficium and fairy-related passages emerge 
fully developed in her very first confession.... [and] vary very little after this 
date”(Visions 235). 
Michael Taussig has noted how in some instances the therapeutic yagé visions of his 
Colombian informants mobilize their redemptive power by “...pivoting on the glory of 
the antiself as colonially contrived...”, taking the form of a resplendent Colombian 
Army battalion for one Indian, while a white colonist encountered a shapeshifting 
tiger-devil in the person of his shamanic psychopomp (Shamanism 327). The image, as 
well as the efficacy and energy, of the antiself is drawn from the discourse generated 
from both sides in an epistemic hegemon's campaign of subjugation and assimilation. 
As Taussig (Shamanism 327) observes, the healing effected through this figure 
“[s]urely...depends far more on the existence, the reproduction, and the artistry of 
difference as otherness and as oppression than it does on solidarity”. The antiself 
embodies the course by which “...certain historical events, notably political events of 
conquest and colonization, become objectified in the contemporary shamanic 
repertoire as magically empowered imagery capable of causing as well as relieving 
misfortune”(Shamanism 367). By precisely the same process, witchcraft in ancient 
Mesopotamia comprised “...an imaginary anti-institution... [coinciding] with the other 
counter-forces of hegemonic rule: foreign enemies, primordial gods, demons, wild 
animals, the whole undomesticated universe”.15 Turning to the medieval and early-
                                                          
15 Wim van Binsbergen and Frans Wiggermann, 'Magic in History – A Theoretical Perspective, and its 
application to Ancient Mesopotamia', in T. Abusch and K. van der Toorn (eds.), Mesopotamian Magic – 
Textual, Historical, and Interpretative Perspectives, Groningen, Styx, 1999, p. 28. 
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modern periods, successive ecclesiastical institutions were engaged in an ongoing 
campaign of proselytizing to a never-quite satisfactorily assimilated public. This 
campaign comprised a never-quite completed process of epistemic conquest and 
colonization, from which the persona of the Devil, the Christian antiself par excellence, 
emerged as the predominant magically empowered image for both hegemon and 
subaltern. Thus, the spirit-helpers encountered by some magical practitioners 
“...inversely echoed the [beatific] stereotype by conforming to Christian ideas about 
the Devil being a tall, frightening man in black, or possessing cloven, hairy feet and a 
fearsome demeanour”(Cunning Folk 225). 
The ease with which individuals may have been able to renegotiate their moral 
position within a nominally Christian Weltanschauung is suggested by the relatively 
anthro-centric and relativizing way in which its inhabitants were conceived. As Wilby 
describes, “...for those with an obscure grasp of Christian teaching the cosmos would 
have been peopled by a medley of supernatural figures of both Christian and pre-
Christian origin, with little or no discrimination made between them, either morally or 
ontologically”(Cunning Folk 118). For these people, the Devil remained just one morally 
ambivalent spirit among many – albeit perhaps one more inclined to wickedness than 
most – and not yet become the metaphysical principle of absolute evil. Just as 
Colombian “[f]olk healing respectfully takes Church doctrine from the priests... 
reappropriating for its own use what the Church has appropriated from popular 
mythology drawn from the dreams of the oppressed”(Shamanism 169), the peasants' 
benevolent, if capricious, spirit-helper becomes the Church's devil, who again becomes 
the peasants' benefactor in this new guise. 
Nonetheless, wickedness was a salient quality of those spirit-entities with whom 
practitioners of maleficium engaged through quasi-shamanistic visionary experiences. As 
Wilby (Visions 313) observes, “...malevolence of some kind is present in most spirit-
group narratives...”, many of which seem in no way to conform to the prosocial 
community-defense rationale typically adduced to justify shamanic acts of magical 
aggression. Isobel Gowdie, for instance, “...performed rituals to raise winds, steal milk 
and reduce fertility...” with no discernible motive besides causing harm, and believed 
herself to have engaged in seemingly arbitrary acts of supernatural murder (Visions 321-
3). 
The narratives by which one represents reality to oneself mutually construct one 
another. Thus, one narrative, comprising the concrete banalities of injustice, inequality, 
and envy embedded within quotidian social life, contextualizes, provokes, and 
ultimately succumbs to a narrative wherein one imagines oneself empowered to act in 
the world through a compact with the Devil. In aphorism 92 of Human, All-Too-Human 
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Nietzsche (Genealogy 168) conditions the concept of justice as “...repayment and 
exchange on the assumption of an approximately equal power position; revenge 
originally belongs in the domain of justice, being an exchange.” From this perspective, 
the very possibility of obtaining just restitution for the inferior party in any asymmetric 
power dyad would seem to be precluded on purely structural grounds. It is into this 
kind of asymmetric relation, however, that the figure of the Devil enters as a fulcrum 
upon which the moral hierarchy is inverted, redefining the subaltern's self-valuation 
and susceptibility to justice. This axial capacity of the Devil derives from his role as the 
essential 'other' against which the slave morality defines itself in Nietzsche's 
genealogical scheme. Nietzsche (Genealogy 36-7) argues that “[w]hile every noble 
morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the 
outset says No to... what is 'not itself '...” because “...in order to exist, slave morality 
always first needs a hostile external world...”. And the hostile 'other' of the slave 
morality, the one who “...is 'evil' in the sense of the morality of ressentiment.... is: precisely 
the 'good man' of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but 
dyed in another color...”(Genealogy 40). Within the moral cosmos of early modern 
Christendom, oriented by original sin and guilt toward a norm of self-abasement, the 
aforementioned color is the stereotyped black of the Devil, presiding over a sabbat of 
libertine indulgence, or tempting the vulnerable with promises of power. The Devil is 
elevated as the evil 'master' against whom the community of the good defines itself. 
When members of that epistemic community reject the passivity this moral status 
entails, however, it is this same figure of the master through whom they can then 
project their self-recognition as subjects entitled to justice. The transgressive nature of 
this rejection is not limited to the eschatological prospects of the individual's soul, 
however. In a society conditioned by the presumption of inborn culpability, moral 
justification “...comes to contain the virtue of frequent suffering, deprivation... as a 
virtue that makes the community look good to the evil gods, steaming up to them like a 
continual sacrifice of atonement...”(Genealogy 187). The state of abjection thus serves as 
an apotropaic, invoking divine grace – or at least forbearance – upon the community; 
rejecting that state, as does the witch, is therefore an essentially antisocial act. For that 
very reason, however, it is through this antinomian counter-morality that the possibility 
of an autonomous individuality independent of the interests and will of the collective 
becomes thinkable for persons enculturated to the highly interdependent and 
paternalistic social structures of early modern communities.  
Certainly, this is not to say that the pursuit of restitutive justice by early modern 
Christians was unknown outside of a more or less proscribed ideological sphere of 
transgression. Indeed, Nietzsche's 'good men', emblematic of the slave morality, pursue 
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precisely that end: “...what they desire they call, not retaliation, but 'the triumph of 
justice'; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate 'injustice,' they hate 
'godlessness'...”(Genealogy 48). But whereas the acquiescent morality of these 
'manufacturers of ideals' always leaves arbitration of justice in the hands of some 
appellate authority – whether God or, more immediately, a communal government 
which, notionally administering His will on Earth, applies the laws of the state for the 
maintenance of the state – the witch, by contrast, bypasses intermediation and usurps 
ultimate authority from God, effecting justice in retaliation by and for her- or himself 
alone. 
One final case, from the city of Offenburg, Baden in 1601, will serve to 
demonstrate how the intersecting elements of revenge, social and economic power 
differentials, a common stock of tropes surrounding the concept of maleficium, and 
pervasive preoccupation with material resources served to contextualize the 
construction of a discourse on witchcraft within the unfolding processes of accusation 
and confession: 
...[T]wo grape-stealers... mother and daughter, Eva and Marie Vetter—vagrants 
apparently without any fixed place of abode.... were caught by Olmüller Weid 
eating a bunch of grapes in his vineyard; he brought them to town and handed 
them to the authorities. They expected the pillory. This the Rath proposed, but 
the Rathsherr Christopf Rues... insisted on a prosecution for witchcraft. (Materials 
1144) 
There follows a long series of tortured confessions and accusations, in the course of 
which: 
[Marie] evidently recognized her case as hopeless and was resolved to avenge 
herself. She was especially hard on Else Gwinner, saying she had boasted 
practicing witchcraft for sixteen years. She had emptied quantities of caterpillars 
and beetles in the town forests and had such hatred for the town that as long as 
she lived there would be no more acorns. The acorn crop in those days was a 
matter of supreme importance, and in Offenburg the town forest not only enabled 
the citizens to fatten their swine but in good years was a source of considerable 
revenue. (Materials 1144-5) 
And shortly before the Vetters' execution: 
[Agathe Gewinner] was then confronted with Marie, who asked her if she did not 
remember how they two attempted to raise a storm which should destroy the 
harvests and raise the price of a loaf to a shilling so that her mother could provide 
for her children, and she described all details. Agathe denied it all, was taken 
back to her cell and beaten with rods till she confessed. (Materials 1146) 
The point here is to indicate that whether or not maleficium had actually been 
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performed in any particular case, the same forces of ressentiment and revenge, 
conditioned by the anxieties of socioeconomic precarity in stratified societies, 
generated powerful images by which groups and individuals could feel authorized to 
pursue their respective self-interests – whether demonizing the underclass whose 
insurrection one dreaded, or demonizing oneself in order to carry out that 
insurrection. While the often deadly consequences for individuals and shattering 
ramifications for their communities must not be discounted, we might nonetheless 
speculate that out of this moral crucible embedded within the social and material 
relations of early modernity perhaps emerged the prototype of a more fully integrated 
human being, its sense of agency, albeit projected onto a demonic avatar, no longer 
repressed. For Nietzsche (Genealogy 52) reflected that “...today there is perhaps no more 
decisive mark of a 'higher nature,' a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided... 
and a genuine battleground of these opposed values.” Perhaps the dialectical process of 
transcending contradictory moralities was born in the consciousness of the vengeful, 
embittered peasant. 
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